Santa

Santa is a binary whitelisting/blacklisting system for macOS. It consists of a
kernel extension that monitors for executions, a userland daemon that makes
execution decisions based on the contents of a SQLite database, a GUI agent
that notifies the user in case of a block decision and a command-line utility
for managing the system and synchronizing the database with a server.
It is named Santa because it keeps track of binaries that are naughty or nice.
Santa is a project of Google's Macintosh Operations Team.
Docs
The Santa docs are stored in the
Docs directory. A Read the
Docs instance is available here: https://santa.readthedocs.io.
The docs include deployment options, details on how parts of Santa work and
instructions for developing Santa itself.
Get Help
If you have questions or otherwise need help getting started,
the santa-dev group is a
great place.
If you believe you have a bug, feel free to report an
issue and we'll respond as soon as we
can.
Admin-Related Features
-
Multiple modes: In the default MONITOR mode, all binaries except those marked
as blacklisted will be allowed to run, whilst being logged and recorded in
the events database. In LOCKDOWN mode, only whitelisted binaries are allowed
to run. -
Event logging: When the kext is loaded, all binary launches are logged. When
in either mode, all unknown or denied binaries are stored in the database to
enable later aggregation. -
Certificate-based rules, with override levels: Instead of relying on a
binary's hash (or 'fingerprint'), executables can be whitelisted/blacklisted
by their signing certificate. You can therefore trust/block all binaries by a
given publisher that were signed with that cert across version updates. A
binary can only be whitelisted by its certificate if its signature validates
correctly, but a rule for a binary's fingerprint will override a decision for
a certificate; i.e. you can whitelist a certificate while blacklisting a
binary signed with that certificate, or vice-versa. -
Path-based rules (via NSRegularExpression/ICU): This allows a similar feature
to that found in Managed Client (the precursor to configuration profiles,
which used the same implementation mechanism), Application Launch
Restrictions via the mcxalr binary. This implementation carries the added
benefit of being configurable via regex, and not relying on LaunchServices.
As detailed in the wiki, when evaluating rules this holds the lowest
precedence. -
Failsafe cert rules: You cannot put in a deny rule that would block the
certificate used to sign launchd, a.k.a. pid 1, and therefore all components
used in macOS. The binaries in every OS update (and in some cases entire new
versions) are therefore auto-whitelisted. This does not affect binaries from
Apple's App Store, which use various certs that change regularly for common
apps. Likewise, you cannot blacklist Santa itself, and Santa uses a distinct
separate cert than other Google apps.
Intentions and Expectations
No single system or process will stop all attacks, or provide 100% security.
Santa is written with the intention of helping protect users from themselves.
People often download malware and trust it, giving the malware credentials, or
allowing unknown software to exfiltrate more data about your system. As a
centrally managed component, Santa can help stop the spread of malware among a
large fleet of machines. Independently, Santa can aid in analyzing what is
running on your computer.
Santa is part of a defense-in-depth strategy, and you should continue to
protect hosts in whatever other ways you see fit.
Security and Performance-Related Features
-
In-kernel caching: whitelisted binaries are cached in the kernel so the
processing required to make a request is only done if the binary isn't
already cached. -
Userland components validate each other: each of the userland components (the
daemon, the GUI agent and the command-line utility) communicate with each
other using XPC and check that their signing certificates are identical
before any communication is accepted. -
Kext uses only KPIs: the kernel extension only uses provided kernel
programming interfaces to do its job. This means that the kext code should
continue to work across OS versions.
Known Issues
-
Santa only blocks execution (execve and variants), it doesn't protect against
dynamic libraries loaded with dlopen, libraries on disk that have been
replaced, or libraries loaded usingDYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
. As of version
0.9.1 we do address __PAGEZERO missing issues that were
exploited in some versions of macOS. We are working on also protecting
against similar avenues of attack. -
Kext communication security: the kext will only accept a connection from a
single client at a time and said client must be running as root. We haven't
yet found a good way to ensure the kext only accepts connections from a valid
client. -
Database protection: the SQLite database is installed with permissions so
that only the root user can read/write it. We're considering approaches to
secure this further. -
Scripts: Santa is currently written to ignore any execution that isn't a
binary. This is because after weighing the administration cost vs the
benefit, we found it wasn't worthwhile. Additionally, a number of
applications make use of temporary generated scripts, which we can't possibly
whitelist and not doing so would cause problems. We're happy to revisit this
(or at least make it an option) if it would be useful to others.
Sync Servers
-
The
santactl
command-line client includes a flag to synchronize with a
management server, which uploads events that have occurred on the machine and
downloads new rules. There are several open-source servers you can sync with:- Upvote - An AppEngine-based server
that implements social voting to make managing a large fleet easier. - Moroz - A simple golang server that
serves hardcoded rules from simple configuration files. - Zentral - A
centralized service that pulls data from multiple sources and deploy
configurations to multiple services.
- Upvote - An AppEngine-based server
-
Alternatively,
santactl
can configure rules locally (without a sync
server).
Screenshots
A tool like Santa doesn't really lend itself to screenshots, so here's a video
instead.
Kext Signing
Kernel extensions on macOS 10.9 and later must be signed using an Apple-provided
Developer ID certificate with a kernel extension flag. Without it, the only way
to load an extension is to enable kext-dev-mode or disable SIP, depending on
the OS version.
There are two possible solutions for this, for distribution purposes:
-
Use a pre-built, pre-signed
version of the kext that we supply.
Each time changes are made to the kext code we will update the pre-built
version that you can make use of. This doesn't prevent you from making changes
to the non-kext parts of Santa and distributing those. If you make changes to
the kext and make a pull request, we can merge them in and distribute a new
version of the pre-signed kext. -
Apply for your own kext signing
certificate. Apple will only grant
this for broad distribution within an organization, they won't issue them just
for testing purposes.
Contributing
Patches to this project are very much welcome. Please see the
CONTRIBUTING
file.
Disclaimer
This is not an official Google product.